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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is before the Court after a grant of a Writ of Certiorari. This
Court has jurisdiction under 78A-3-102(3)(a) to hear an appeal from the
adjudication of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals heard an appeal
from a final Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court under 78A-4103(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding any
modification of the lease agreement only extended the time for making
payments.
Standard of Review: On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the
decision of the Court of Appeals for correctness, ceding no deference to the
Court of Appeals. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶ 11, 103 P.3d 699.
Issue No. 2: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding an
extension of time to make payments did not constitute a material
modification of the lease that relieved the Petitioner of any obligations as
guarantor.
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Standard of Review: On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the
decision of the Court of Appeals for correctness, ceding no deference to the
Court of Appeals. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶ 11, 103 P.3d 699.
Issue No. 3: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in declining to
address Petitioner’s arguments for an alternate ground for affirmance and in
remanding with a directive to enter judgment in favor of Respondent.
Standard of Review: On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the
decision of the Court of Appeals for correctness, ceding no deference to the
Court of Appeals. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶ 11, 103 P.3d 699.
CONTROLLING AUTHORITY
None.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below:
Plaintiff/Respondent, PC Riverview (Plaintiff), brought an action
against former Tenant, Defendant Hong Gaung Lin (Defendant Lin) for
unpaid rent. The complaint also included a cause of action against
Defendant/Petitioner Xiao-Yan Cao (Defendant Cao) as a guarantor on the
lease. This is the second action filed by the Plaintiff against the Defendants.
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In the first case filed May 18, 2010, Case No. 100908746, Defendant Cao
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against the Plaintiff on August 23,
2010, asserting that the Plaintiff lacked standing to bring an action on the
guarantee against Defendant Cao because there was no privity of contract
between the Plaintiff and Defendant Cao and no evidence that the guarantee
was assigned to the Plaintiff from the prior landlord, Riverview Properties.
On October 28, 2010, the Third District Court, the Honorable L.A. Dever,
presiding, issued a minute entry order favorable to Defendant Cao. The
Trial Court found that the Plaintiff failed to provide evidence of any alleged
transfer of interest. The Trial Court stayed final entry of the order to allow
the parties to attend mediation. On November 1, 2010, Plaintiff provided
Defendant Cao with an Agreement that was reached between Plaintiff and
Defendant Lin on September 8, 2010. Plaintiff requested Defendant Cao’s
stipulation to dismissal of that case. On November 3, 2010, Defendant Cao
notified Plaintiff that Defendant Cao would not agree to the dismissal of the
case. Defendant Cao was not involved in the negotiations between Plaintiff
and Defendant Lin, Defendant Cao had no knowledge of the Agreement
between Plaintiff and Defendant Lin when it was agreed upon by the parties.
Defendant Cao also stated that the new Agreement between Plaintiff and
3

Defendant Lin abrogated Defendant Cao’s surety obligations under the prior
Lease Agreement. Plaintiff provided no response to Defendant Cao’s letter.
Plaintiff failed to further prosecute Case No. 10090874. Eventually, the case
was dismissed for lack of prosecution on October 17, 2011. On March 3,
2014, Plaintiff filed the current action, Case No. 149902947, again claiming
that Defendant Cao was the surety for the Agreement between Plaintiff and
Defendant Lin. Plaintiff obtained summary judgment against Defendant
Lin. Plaintiff was awarded $7,326.55 in damages, $1,208.88 in prejudgment
interest, $117.00 in costs and $1,400.00 in attorney’s fees. On April 29,
2015, a bench trial was held, the Honorable Katie Bernards-Goodman
presided. After hearing the evidence, the Trial Court issued its ruling from
the bench. The Trial Court found that Plaintiff and Defendant Lin materially
modified the lease agreement thereby negating the suretyship of Defendant
Cao. Because the Trial Court found in Defendant Cao’s favor regarding the
modification, the Trial Court declined to rule on Defendant Cao’s argument
that the assignment of the guarantee from Riverview Properties to PC
Riverview was improper. An Order and Judgment was signed by the Court
on May 26, 2015. The Plaintiff filed the Notice of Appeal on June 11, 2015.
The Court of Appeals issued its decision on August 25, 2016 reversing the
4

Trial Court and ordering the Trial Court to enter judgment in favor of the
Plaintiff.
Statement of Facts:

1.

On or about October 7, 2003, Chai Teng Tsoa and Hong Min

Zhang assigned their interest in a Lease with Riverview Properties to L&C
Unlimited, with the approval of the Landlord, Riverview Properties.
Defendant Cao signed the Lease personally as Guarantor to the agreement.
The Lease expired on September 30, 2008. Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 6.
2.

On or about March 9, 2006, L&C Unlimited assigned their

interest in a Lease with Riverview Properties to Hong G. Lin, with the
approval of the Landlord, Riverview Properties. Defendant Lin signed a
Guarantee to the Lease. Defendant Cao signed the Lease as Guarantor.
Defendant Lin signed a Guarantee to the Lease. The Lease for Hong G. Lin
was extended to September 30, 2013. Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 7.
3.

On or about June 19, 2006, PC Riverview acquired the leased

property from Riverview Properties. TT(Trial Transcript) page 8.
4.

On May 20, 2010, Defendant Cao was served with the

Complaint in Case No. 10090874, CR (Court Record) page 108-110, TT 39.
5

5.

Prior to being served with the Complaint, Defendant Cao was

given no notice of that Defendant Lin had failed to make payments under the
Lease. TT 39-40.
6.

Prior to being served with the Complaint, Defendant Cao was

given no notice of the transfer of the property from Riverview Properties and
PC Riverview. TT 40-41.
7.

On June 28, 2010, Defendant Cao filed a Motion to Compel

Eviction Proceedings in Case No. 10090874. CR 108-110, TT 37-38.
8.

On or about July 2, 2010, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to

Motion to Compel Eviction, along with a Declaration of Carolyn Carter with
the Court. CR 112-13.
9.

According to Carolyn Carter, Plaintiff elected to delay

enforcement of Defendant Lin’s obligations in exchange for partial
payments. The Plaintiff accepted partial payments from Defendant Lin for
several months prior to filing their Complaint against Defendant Cao and
Defendant Lin. CR 112-13.
10.

Records produced by the Plaintiff show that Defendant Lin was

behind on his rent obligations starting in October 2008. CR 034.
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11.

By the time Plaintiff filed their initial lawsuit in May 2010,

Defendant Lin was $20,050.12 behind in his rent. CR 036.
12.

In May, 2010, Defendant Lin incurred $969.25 in late charges

for the month of May for his outstanding balance. CR 36.
13.

The late charges reached a peak of $1,069.18 in June 2010. CR

14.

Defendant Cao was completely unaware of this business

36.

arrangement between Plaintiff and Defendant Lin. TT 39-40.
15.

On August 23, 2010, Defendant Cao filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment in Case No. 10090874. CR 108-110.
16.

On September 8, 2010, Plaintiff and Defendant Lin reached an

agreement whereby they modified the payments due to Plaintiff from
Defendant Lin. Defendant’s Trial Exhibit 2.
17.

When Plaintiff and Defendant Lin reached their agreement,

Defendant Lin owed the Plaintiff $23,951.28. CR 036 and Defendant’s
Exhibit 2.
18.

The Agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant Lin

acknowledges that it included 7/8th of the late fees that Defendant Lin
incurred. Defendant’s Exhibit 2.
7

19.

On September 14, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in

Opposition to Summary Judgment. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition
to Summary Judgment failed to notify Defendant Cao or the Court that
Plaintiff and Defendant Lin had reached an agreement modifying the terms
of the Lease. CR 108-110
20.

On September 27, 2010, Defendant Cao filed a Reply

Memorandum. CR 108-110
21.

On October 28, 2010, the Court issued a ruling on Defendant

Cao’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court looked favorably on
Defendant Cao’s Motion; however, the Court stayed final decision on the
matter while the parties attempted a resolution through ADR. Defendant
Exhibit 1.
22.

On November 1, 2010, Plaintiff faxed the Agreement between

Plaintiff and Defendant Lin to Defendant Cao. Defendant’s Exhibit 2.
23.

On November 3, 2010, Defendant Cao sent a letter to Plaintiff

notifying Plaintiff that Defendant Cao would not agree to the dismissal of
the case. Defendant Cao was not involved in the negotiations between
Plaintiff and Defendant Lin, Defendant Cao had no knowledge of the
Agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant Lin when it was agreed upon by
8

the parties. Defendant Cao also stated that the new Agreement between
Plaintiff and Defendant Lin abrogated Defendant Cao’s surety obligations
under the prior Lease Agreement. Defendant’s Exhibit 3.
24.

Plaintiff provided no response to Defendant Cao’s letter.

Plaintiff failed to further prosecute Case No. 10090874. Eventually, the case
was dismissed for lack of prosecution on October 17, 2011. CR 108-110.
25.

On March 3, 2014, Plaintiff filed this case again, alleging that

Defendant Cao was the surety for the Agreement between Plaintiff and
Defendant Lin. See CR 3-6.
26.

On December 9, 2014, judgment for the Plaintiff against

Defendant Lin was entered by the Court. CR 200-201.
27.

April 29, 2015, a bench trial was held before the Honorable

Katie Bernards-Goodman. See Trial Transcript.
28.

At trial, the parties and the Court raised the issue of when

Defendant Cao’s guarantee expired. TT 29-32.
29.

At trial, Defendant Cao objected to the introduction of the lease

agreement and argued that the assignment was impermissible. TT 45-46.
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30.

The Trial Court ruled that there was a material modification to

the parties’ contract and Defendant Cao was released from her surety
obligation. TT 51.
31.

The Trial Court specifically declined to rule on the assignment.

TT 51.
32.

The Trial Court did not issue a ruling on the expiration of the

guarantee. TT 51.
33.

An Order and Judgment was signed by the Court on May 26,

34.

The Plaintiff filed the Notice of Appeal on June 11, 2015.

35.

The Court of Appeals issued its decision on August 25, 2016

2015.

reversing the Trial Court and ordering the Trial Court to enter judgment in
favor of the Plaintiff.
36.

On appeal, Defendant Cao raised the issues of whether her

obligations under the guarantee expired. Brief of Appellee pages 13-17.
37.

On appeal, Defendant Cao contested that the assignment was

not valid. Brief of Appellee pages 23-25.
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38.

The Court of Appeals did not issue any rulings on either the

assignment or the expiration issues. See PC Riverview LLC v. Xiao-YanCao 2016 UT App 178 paragraphs 6, 7 and 8.
39.

The Court of Appeals decision relied solely on whether the

September 8, 2010 Agreement between Respondent and Defendant Lin
modified the parties’ contact. PC Riverview LLC v. Xiao-Yan-Cao 2016
UT App 178 paragraphs 6, 7 and 8.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Trial Court found that the Plaintiff and Defendant Lin materially
modified the lease agreement. The Trial Court found that the Plaintiff in
allowing Defendant Lin to fall far behind on his rent and to make partial
payments during this time, without notifying Defendant Cao, materially
modified the parties’ contract. The material modification relieved
Defendant Cao as a surety to the lease agreement. The Court of Appeals
failed to review the facts relied upon by the Trial Court. Instead the Court of
Appeals chose to focus solely on the Workout Agreement. This Court
should reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the Trial Court. Plaintiff and
Defendant Lin made material modifications when the Plaintiff, without

11

notice to Defendant Cao, allowed Defendant Lin to remain in the premises
for 20 months prior to initiating their initial complaint 1. This arrangement
went beyond a mere extension of time, because under this arrangement,
Defendant Lin incurred substantial late fees. The Court of Appeals also
erred in their analysis of the Workout Agreement. When Plaintiff and
Defendant Lin executed their Workout Agreement in September 2010, that
Agreement also included late fees. The Workout Agreement went beyond
an extension of time to make payments. The Workout Agreement included
the late fee penalty. The Workout Agreement also modified the late fees due
under the original contract. By proceeding in this manner, Plaintiff and
Defendant Lin exposed Defendant Cao to excessive late charges under the
original contract and then modified those charges under the Workout
Agreement. The Court should issue a ruling requiring that extensions of
time must be agreed upon by the surety to a contract. The Court should
reverse Court of Appeals because even an extension of time under prior
Utah Supreme Court precedents find that such extensions are a material
modification which relief the surety. Finally, there remained outstanding

1

Even when the Plaintiff initiated their complaint, they did not seek to evict
Defendant Lin. When Defendant Cao brought a motion to evict Defendant
12

issues that needed to be resolved by the Trial Court. The Court of Appeals
should have remanded this case back to the Trial Court for resolution of
those issues prior to directing a judgment.
ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT LIN MODIFIED THE LEASE
AGREEMENT
The Trial Court determined that a material modification occurred
“when they had Mr. Lin’s rent so far behind and allowed him to make
changes and differences to that and didn’t notify the guarantor of that. If I’m
guaranteeing something and there’s changes like that and somebody’s way
behind and they’re letting them catch up and they’re not telling me, I would
consider that a material modification.” Trial Transcript page 51-52. In
reversing the Trial Court, the Court of Appeals stated “Cao was not relieved
of her obligations as guarantor because the Workout was the sole
modification to the original lease, and the Workout only modified the timing
of the Tenant’s payments by extending the time in which past due rent could
be paid.” Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision page 4. The statement
by the Court of Appeals was incorrect on two levels.
Lin, Plaintiff, not Defendant Lin, opposed the motion.
13

First, the Workout Agreement was not the sole modification to the
parties’ agreement. Well before the Workout Agreement, Plaintiff and
Defendant Lin engaged in a series of actions that ran contrary to their
obligations under the Lease Agreement. It was these actions that the Trial
Court relied on in its ruling. The Court of Appeals failed to properly address
these events. When the Court examines the actions of Plaintiff and
Defendant Lin prior to the Workout Agreement, the Court will reach the
same conclusion as the Trial Court.
Second, the Workout Agreement modified more than the timing of the
Tenant’s rent payments. The Workout Agreement made material
modifications to the late payment provisions under the lease. The Workout
did not fully waive the late fees. Instead, it lessened the late fees if
Defendant Lin successful completed the Workout. If Defendant Lin failed
to complete the Workout, it reinstated the late fees that were incurred
because Plaintiff and Defendant Lin agreed that Defendant Lin should make
partial rent payments over several month. Finally, the Workout created did
not merely extend time for payment it created balloon payments for
Defendant Lin.
1.

Status and the Applicable Law
14

The law recognizes that parties to a contract may have different
obligations and defenses depending on their status. Defendant Cao signed
the Assignment and Extension of Lease as an accommodating party.
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7 merely refers to Defendant Cao as “Guarantor.”
Defendant Cao signed the guaranty of the Lease personally, without
compensation. This Court has long recognized the status of noncompensated sureties:
Sureties are persons favored by the law. Their obligations are
ordinarily assumed without pecuniary compensation, and are
not to be extended by implication or construction. Their
liability is, as it is put, strictissimi juris. They have a right to
stand on the terms of their obligation, and, having consented to
be bound to a certain extent only, their liability must be found
within the terms of that consent, strictly construed. It is not
sufficient that he may sustain no injury by a change in the
contract, or that it may even be for his benefit. He has a right to
stand on the very terms of his contract, and if he does not assent
to any variation of it and a variation is made, it is fatal. M.H.
Walker Realty Co. v. American Surety Co., 60 Utah 435, 211 P.
998 (1922)

The Courts’ uniformly recognize that there is a significant difference
between sureties for profit and those who are personal sureties.
The modern authorities seem to be almost a unit upon the
proposition that a different rule of construction applies to
different classes of sureties. In the case of a private or
voluntary surety without compensation the surety is held to be a
15

favorite of the law, and the contract, the performance of which
he guarantees, is construed strictly in favor of the surety.
Strictissimi juris is the term used to express the rule by which
his liability shall be determined. Dennis Dillon Oldsmobile,
GMC, Inc. v. Zdunich, Utah, 668 P.2d 557, 560 (1983) quoting
M.H. Walker Realty Co. v. American Surety Co., 60 Utah 435,
211 P. 998 (1922))
This Court affirmed the application of these principals in U–M Invs. v.
Ray, 701 P.2d 1061, 1062 (Utah 1985) (We recognize that in construing the
terms of a bond executed by a voluntary or private surety, the rule of
strictissimi juris applies, and the private surety's liability is limited by the
terms of the contract. Under the concept of Strictissimi juris, a creditor may
not make alterations to the parties’ contractual relationship. “Dealings
between the debtor and the primary obligor which materially modify the
terms of the guarantor's undertaking generally result in the discharge of the
guarantor's obligation.” Carrier Brokers, Inc. v. Spanish Trail, 751 P.2d 258,
261 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) quoting Essex Int'l, Inc. v. Clamage, 440 F.2d
547, 550 (7th Cir.1971). See also Baldwin v. Becker, 277 F. 930, 933-34 (8th
Cir, 1921) (Any change in the contract, on which they are sureties, made by
the principal parties to it without their assent, discharges them, . . . Nor does
it matter how trivial the change, or even that it may be of advantage to the
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sureties. They have a right to stand upon the very terms of their
undertaking.) Under these principals, any material alteration by Plaintiff and
Defendant Lin to the underlying obligation relieved Defendant Cao of her
surety obligation.
2.

The Initial Modification

The Trial Court determined that Plaintiff and Defendant Lin modified
the Lease through their subsequent actions, rather than through the Workout
Agreement. Defendant Lin first fell behind in his rent in October 2008.
Over the next twenty months, Defendant Lin continued to incur past due rent
and late fees to the sum of $20,050.12. During this time, there is no
evidence that the Plaintiff took any action to evict Defendant Lin.
Defendant Lin benefited from this arrangement because he continued to
operate his restaurant without the fear of eviction. Plaintiff benefitted from
the partial payments from Defendant Lin and the presumption that
Defendant Cao, as Guarantor, would ultimately be financially responsible
for both the past due rent and the late fees of Defendant Lin. During these
twenty months, neither Plaintiff nor Defendant Lin took any action to notify
Defendant Cao of her increasing financial obligation under the Lease. The
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actions of Plaintiff and Defendant Lin formed the basis for the Trial Court’s
determination that they modified the parties’ contract.
The determination of whether a contractual breach is material is a
question of fact. Wilson v. Johnson, 2010 UT App 137, ¶ 25, 234 P.3d 1156,
cert. denied, 241 P.3d 771. Likewise, whether there is a modification to the
parties’ contract is also a question of fact. See generally Richard Barton
Enters., Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996) and also the
concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Howe at 384(“Whether a
contract has been modified by the parties thereto is ordinarily a question of
fact for the trier of fact, as where the evidence is conflicting or the terms of
the agreement are equivocal or uncertain.” Johnson v. Allied Stores Corp.,
106 Idaho 363, 679 P.2d 640, 645 (1984)). The trial court’s factual findings
should not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Burton Lumber &
Hardware Co. v. Graham, 2008 UT App 207, ¶ 8, 186 P.3d 1012. The
Court of Appeals failed to attack the factual determination which formed the
basis for the Trial Court’s decision. Because the Trial Court’s decision was
based on the factual determination that the actions of Plaintiff and Defendant
Lin constituted a modification of the contract, this Court should reverse the
Court of Appeals.
18

The Trial Court’s determination is also legally sound. Although the
rule of strictissimi juris applies to Defendant Cao’s defenses and obligations,
ordinary tests of the meaning and intentions of the parties still applies. U–M
Invs. v. Ray, 701 P.2d 1061, 1062 (Utah 1985). When interpreting the
contract of the parties, the Courts should look at principals applicable to all
contracts.
Plaintiff temporarily suspended their enforcement of the eviction
rights under the Court while allowing late fees to accumulate against
Defendant Cao without her knowledge or approval. This Court has held
that temporarily suspending the right of enforcement against the principal
debtor without knowledge and approval of the surety, relieved the surety of
further liability on the original contract. First Nat. Bank of Layton v. Egbert,
663 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah 1983)(relying on §70A-3-606 U.C.A.). It is clear that
Plaintiff and Defendant Lin suspended Plaintiff’s right of enforcement under
the contract to allow Defendant Lin more time to pay his back rent. At the
same time, Plaintiff benefitted from this suspension by way of the ever
increasing late fees. On this basis alone, the Trial Court was warranted in
finding that there was a material modification. Although §70A-3-606
19

U.C.A. may not be applicable to this case, the same principals can be applied
to these dealings through the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Both Plaintiff and Defendant Lin modified their obligation to
Defendant Cao under the principals of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is present in every
contract. Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, parties to a
contract impliedly promise not to intentionally do anything to injure the
other party's right to receive the benefits of the contract. Eggett v. Wasatch
Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28, ¶ 14, 94 P.3d 193. In this case, Plaintiff and
Defendant Lin modified that implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
by taking actions the strictly benefitted themselves while injuring Defendant
Cao. Plaintiff benefitted from additional late fees and Defendant Lin
benefitted from the operation of his restaurant while making partial rent
payments. Defendant Cao, without any knowledge of this arrangement, was
unable to bring any action earlier to assert her rights and protect her
interests. Even when Defendant Cao did attempt to assert her rights by
seeking Defendant Lin’s eviction, Plaintiff opposed the eviction in order to
maintain this beneficial relationship. Plaintiff actions were again contrary to
the covenant. The covenant prevents a party from impeding the other's
20

rights under the contract. Markham v. Bradley, 2007 UT App 379, ¶ 18, 173
P.3d 865. The Trial Court properly determined that the actions of Plaintiff
and Defendant Lin modified the parties’ obligations under the Lease. The
Trial Court determined that the actions of the Plaintiff and Defendant Lin
violated their duty of good faith and fair dealing towards Defendant Cao.
Plaintiff and Defendant Lin altered the Lease when they disregarded their
obligations of good faith and fair dealing. This Court should reverse the
Court of Appeals on this basis.
3.

The Workout was More than an Extension of Time

The Court of Appeal’s improperly determined “the Workout only
modified the timing of the Tenant’s payments by extending the time in
which past due rent could be paid.” Court of Appeals Memorandum
Decision page 4. The four corners of the Workout contradict that statement.
The Workout states:
“We agree to write off $6,451.28, of which is 7/8 of the late charges
if, and only if, the monthly back balance payments are received in the
Landlord’s office on or before each payment due date.
If any payments are late, you agree to pay the previous late charges
amount of $6,451.28 as well as any additional interest, collection/legal fees,
or late charges that may accrue based on the lease.” Defendant’s Trial
Exhibit 2.
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By its own terms, the Workout not only restructured the timing of the lease
payments, it also restructured the late payments due.
Plaintiff restructure the amount of late fees due under the Lease.
Plaintiff also made that restructured amount contingent completion of the
Workout Agreement. By its own language, the Workout Agreement went
beyond extending the time for payment. Because the Workout Agreement
modified the parties’ obligations under the Lease, Defendant Cao had the
right to object under the principal of strictissimi juris. Defendant Cao had
the right to stand on the terms of her original obligation. Whether Defendant
Cao sustained no injury from the change, or that it may have been to her
benefit it does not matter. Defendant Cao’s right to stand on the very terms
of the original contract, and her refusal to consent to the Workout is fatal to
the Plaintiff’s claim against her. M.H. Walker Realty Co. v. American Surety
Co., 60 Utah 435, 211 P. 998 (1922).
In addition to modifying the late fee provisions of the lease, the
Workout Agreement created balloon payments for Defendant Lin. Although
Defendant Lin’s rent payments for September 2010 through December 2010
were supposed to be $5,416.92, Defendant Lin paid $9,416.92. These
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potential balloon payments could have seriously undermined the remaining
financial viability of the restaurant and to the detriment of Defendant Cao.
Defendant Cao’s refusal to consent to the Workout was not without
reason. Plaintiff allowed Defendant Lin to make partial rent payments for
several months without notifying Defendant Cao. During this time,
Defendant Cao’s financial burden increased without any notice from either
party. Defendant Cao reasonably concluded that Plaintiff and Defendant Lin
would continue to work together to the financial detriment of Defendant
Cao. This fear was also reinforced by the circumstances surrounding the
creation of the Workout. After Defendant Cao filed a Motion to Evict
Defendant Lin, Plaintiff, not Defendant Lin, opposed the Motion. It was
through the Plaintiff’s Motion that Defendant Cao finally learned the extent
to which Plaintiff was permitting Defendant Lin to make the partial rent
payments, incurring late fees and financially exposing Defendant Cao. After
Defendant Cao filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff and
Defendant Lin negotiated the Workout Agreement without the knowledge or
consent of Defendant Cao. Plaintiff then filed a Memorandum in Opposition
to Summary Judgment without notifying Defendant Cao or the Court
regarding the Workout Agreement. It was only after Defendant Cao
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received a favorable ruling that the Plaintiff provided a copy of the Workout
Agreement. It was reasonable for Defendant Cao no longer wanted to be
financially attached to any agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant Lin.
Because the Workout Agreement modified the late fees due under the
Lease and created balloon payments, the Court of Appeals’ assertion that it
merely extended the time for payment is incorrect. The Court of Appeals’
reliance on the Restatement (Third) of Suretyship & Guaranty § 41 (Am.
Law Inst. 1996) and its decision in DiMeo v. Nupetco Associates, 2013 UT
App 188, 309 P.3d 251, are misplaced. The facts in this case do not fit
within the exception that an extension of time does not relieve a secondary
obligor when there is a modification. If the Court affirms the exception that
an extension does not modify the underlying agreement the Court should
narrowly construe that exception. Based on the facts before this Court, that
exception in not applicable. The Court should reverse the Court of Appeals.
II.

AN EXTENSION OF TIME DOES MATERIALLY MODIFY A

LEASE
This Court has not previously adopted the position that an extension
of time for payment is not a material modification of a contract. In dicta,
this Court seemingly adopted a more strict approach when the Court said
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that a Surety “has a right to stand on the very terms of his contract, and if he
does not assent to any variation of it and a variation is made, it is fatal.
M.H. Walker Realty Co. v. American Surety Co., 60 Utah 435, 211 P. 998
(1922). The Court should reject exception as stated in the Restatement
(Third) of Suretyship & Guaranty § 41 (Am. Law Inst. 1996) and adopted
by the Court of Appeals in DiMeo v. Nupetco Associates, 2013 UT App
188, 309 P.3d 251 and hold that extensions of time for payment without the
consent of the Surety, modify the contract and relieve the Surety.
Even the Court of Appeals’ determination that the Workout
Agreement was a mere extension of time still warrants restrictions of such
extensions. This Court has held that a surety for hire will not be relieved
from his contract by an extension of time without showing injury. Murray
City v. Banks, 62 Utah 296, 219 P. 246. The problem with this approach is
that it is uneconomical. It encourages the principal obligor and oblige to
engage in behavior that may very well be contrary to the interests of the
surety without the surety’s knowledge.
There is a practical reason for requiring the Surety to sign off on
extensions of time before the damage is done. When the Surety signs off to
the underlying contract, the Surety is in the best position to evaluate the
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principal’s default on the underlying contract. When there is an extension,
that Surety is also in the best position to determine the impact on the Surety.
The facts in this case support that proposition. For twenty months, the
Plaintiff extended the time for Defendant Lin to pay his full rent. During
this time, Plaintiff continued to levy ever increasing late fees. Had the
Plaintiff sought Defendant Cao’s input, Defendant Cao could have made up
the monthly difference in the rent. Defendant Cao could seek that
difference directly from Defendant Lin. Economically, Defendant Cao
would have been in a much stronger position to extract this amount from
Defendant Lin because neither Defendant Lin nor Defendant Cao would
have been incurring unnecessary late fees. In addition, Defendant Cao
could have sought concessions from Defendant Lin in the operation of the
restaurant so as to insure its financial viability and thus limiting Defendant
Cao’s future exposure.
The Court of Appeals has restricted lease guarantees to the length of
the original lease. Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 68 (Utah
Ct.App.1994). This approach is consistent with the concept that the surety
should only be bound to the contract that the surety guaranteed. Guarantees
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represent credit risks for sureties. Extending payments beyond the contract
length would extend the credit risk without the sureties assent.
The credit risk of extensions beyond the length of the contract also
are present when balloon payments are involved. This Lease Agreement,
like most leases, required set monthly payments. Monthly lease payments
for small businesses and landlords are practical. Rarely does a small
business have the funds to prepay on their lease. Rarely would a landlord
allow a tenant to occupy a unit for a lengthy period of time with the
expectation that the tenant would just pay the lease amounts in full at the
end of the tenancy. Business plans for both the tenant and the landlord are
made on the expectations of monthly payments. When Plaintiff agreed to
allow Defendant Lin to remain in the property while making balloon
payments for past due rent, Plaintiff and Defendant Lin engage in behavior
that increased the likelihood of Defendant Lin’s business failing by
substantially increasing his monthly expenses. Defendant Cao should have
been afforded the opportunity to evaluate this arrangement in accordance
with the risks that were being place on her in the event of the failure of the
restaurant. In this case, had the Workout not worked, Defendant Cao would
have been on the hooked for the past rent and late fees and Defendant Cao
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would have been responsible for Defendant Lin’s rent during the Workout
time. The Workout may have been the optimal arrangement, but it was for
all of the parties to make that determination, not just the Plaintiff and
Defendant Lin.
All extensions have the potential of modifying the risks to the surety.
Because the surety is in the best position to determine the risks to the
surety, the Court should find that any extension to be a material
modification which requires the agreement of the surety.
III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE REMANDED

THIS MATTER FOR ADDITIONAL FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS
At trial and on appeal, Defendant Cao raised to additional reasons
why she should not be liable for Defendant Lin’s debt. First, Defendant Cao
argued that she signed the Lease and Extension of Lease because she was the
Guarantor on the prior lease and she signed as an accommodating party.
Second, Defendant Cao argued that there was not an appropriate assignment
of the lease. Because the Trial Court found that there was a material
modification of the lease, the Trial Court declined to make any further
rulings. The Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals failed to
address Defendant Cao alternate arguments. Because both arguments need
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factual determinations by the Trial Court, the Court of Appeals should have
remanded this matter. When the Trial Court fails to make critical factual
determinations necessary to resolve the legal issue, it is appropriate to
remand the case back to the Trial Court. Pioneer Builders Co. v. KDA Corp.,
2012 UT 74, ¶ 30, 292 P.3d 672 see also Colonial Pacific Leasing Corp. v.
J.W.C.J.R. Corp. (Utah App.1999), ¶ 24, 977 P.2d 541.
1. Defendant Cao was the Guarantor on the Prior Lease and Her
Obligations Expired with That Lease
Defendant Cao, throughout this process was merely a guarantor on the
prior lease. The tenant prior to Defendant Lin was L & C Unlimited
Corporation. L & C Unlimited Corporation signed Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7 as
the Assignor. Defendant Cao signed Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7 as a Guarantor.
The Plaintiff never sought to make L & C Unlimited a party to this action.
Because the Plaintiff failed to bring in L & C Unlimited, all obligations of
the Assignor have been waived by the Plaintiff. Those obligations cannot be
transferred to Defendant Cao personally merely because the Plaintiff asserts
that she is the Assignor. Defendant Cao is merely an accommodating party
throughout these transactions.
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An examination of the history of the leases, assignments and
extensions helps to determine the intent of the parties. Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5
is a Lease Extension and Modification between Riverview Properties and
Chai Teng Tsao and Hong Min Zhang (Tsao and Zhang). Under paragraph
4 of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5, the lease extension expired on September 30, 2003.
There was no guarantor to Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5. At the end of the lease term
of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5, Riverview Properties and Tsao and Zhang sought to
assign the interest Tsao and Zhang had in the lease to L & C Unlimited in
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 6. Defendant Cao became the Guarantor in Plaintiff’s
Exhibit 6. L & C Unlimited became the Tenant in Plaintiff’s Exhibit 6. The
lease with the landlord, Riverview Properties, was extended to September
30, 2008. In paragraph 4 of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 6, Cao is specifically named
as the Guarantor to this lease, thereby obligating Defendant Cao until
September 30, 2008. In March 2006, L & C Unlimited sought to transfer its
interest in the lease to Defendant Lin. Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7 states that the
“Landlord, Assignor and Assignee desire to extend this Lease for an
additional Five (5) year(s) period.” Plaintiff Exhibit 7 page 2. There is no
mention of the guarantor’s intention to extend the lease. In addition,
although the lease repeatedly uses the singular when referring to the
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Guarantor, the extension has the signatures of two guarantors. Defendant
Cao signed Plaintiff Exhibit 7 as Guarantor on page 4. However, Plaintiff’s
Exhibit 7 contains a specific Guarantor provision on page 6. The specific
guaranty was signed by Defendant Lin. Defendant Cao signed Plaintiff
Exhibit 7 because Defendant Cao was the Guarantor on the prior lease that
was set to expire on September 30, 2008. As Guarantor to that lease,
Defendant Cao was giving her approval to the assignment of the lease to
Defendant Lin. Had the lease been assigned and extended without
Defendant Cao’s approval, Defendant Cao’s obligation would have expired
immediately on the transfer. Under the prior lease, Defendant Cao remained
obligated to the Riverview Properties until September 30, 2008. By
approving of the transfer, Defendant Cao remained obligated until the prior
lease expired on September 30, 2008. Defendant Lin, in signing the explicit
Guaranty attached to Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7 was then the designated Guarantor
for the entire period of the extension. Defendant Cao’s Guarantor
obligations were specifically defined by paragraph 4 of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 6.
Defendant Lin’s obligations were specifically defined by his Guaranty at the
end of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7. Plaintiff acknowledged that Defendant Cao
signed the Extension because of her status as the Guarantor in the prior
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lease. Plaintiff merely assumed that Defendant Cao guaranty lasted as long
as Defendant Lin was in the property. (TT page 30). “We accept the
general principle that in determining the nature and extent of the guarantor's
liability under a guaranty of payment of rent ... the general rules of
construction apply, and the contract will be strictly construed to impose only
those burdens clearly within its terms.” Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson,
886 P.2d 61, 68 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (alteration in original) (quoting
Orange–Co., Inc. v. Brown, 181 Ind.App. 536, 393 N.E.2d 192, 196 (1979)).
Defendant Cao’s guaranty of the lease only covered the obligations under
her lease. Defendant Cao’s obligation did not extend for as long as
Defendant Lin occupied the space, as the Plaintiff urges. See Trolley Square
Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 68 (Utah Ct.App.1994). By having
Defendant Lin sign as a Guarantor under the lease extension, it is clear that
the parties’ intent was that Defendant Lin would be the Guarantor under the
extension. Defendant Cao’s specific obligations expired as of September 30,
2008 when her portion of the lease expired. The Plaintiff provided no
evidence that Plaintiff incurred any damages prior to September 30, 2008.
On this basis, the Court should uphold the decision of the Trial Court. In the
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alternative, the Court should remand this matter to the Trial Court for a
decision on this issue.
2. There was No Appropriate Assignment
When Defendant Cao signed the guaranty, she signed it with
Riverview Properties. Several months after Defendant Cao signed the
guaranty, Plaintiff acquired the property from Riverview Properties.
Defendant Cao was never informed of this transfer. When Defendant Cao
was initially sued, Defendant Cao did not know PC Riverview at all. (TT
page 40-41). Defendant Cao believed her guarantee was with Riverview
Properties. (TT page 41).
Defendant Cao raised the lack of privity of contract in the parties’ first
litigation. In that litigation, the Plaintiff failed to present any evidence of the
transfer of interest which would allow the Plaintiff to proceed against
Defendant Cao. The Court agreed with Defendant Cao’s position, but stayed
the ruling to allow the parties to work out an agreement. Defendant’s Exhibit
1 2. Defendant Cao again raise the question of privity of contract at trial. (TT

The Court should note that one of the reasons that the Trial Court stayed its
ruling was because the Plaintiff asserted that if Defendant Cao could find a
new tenant, Plaintiff would evict Defendant Lin. The Trial Court stayed its
ruling to allow the parties to potential reach an agreement. Plaintiff

2
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page 45-46). The Plaintiff offered Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, a photo copy of a
purported assignment from Riverview Properties to the Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s
Exhibit 1 contains the signatures of Orin R. Woodbury, and Roger T. Sharp.
Neither signature is dated or notarized. No affidavits from Mr. Woodbury or
Mr. Sharp were offered to authenticate their signatures. Neither Mr.
Woodbury nor Mr. Sharp testified at trial. The only evidence offered to
authenticate this document was the testimony of Grace Mitchell, President of
the Plaintiff, who merely stated that she was present when Mr. Woodbury
and Mr. Sharp signed the documents. (TT page 9). Prior to its admission,
the Plaintiff’s offered no details surrounding its creation or execution. The
Plaintiff’s offered no verification from a disinterested party. This document
lacked a notary, contrary to almost every document concerning Riverview
Properties offered by the Plaintiff. See Plaintiff’s Exhibits 4, 5, 6 and 7.
There was simply insufficient evidence to warrant the Trial Court admitting

however, failed to notify either the Trial Court or Defendant Cao, that
Plaintiff and Defendant Lin has already reached an agreement. In fact,
Plaintiff and Defendant Lin reached their agreement on September 8, 2010.
Plaintiff filed their Opposition to Defendant’s Cao’s Motion for Summary
Judgment on September 14, 2010. In reality, there was no reason for the
Trial Court to stay the matter for further settlement, because Defendant Lin
and Plaintiff had already reached an agreement which would negate
Plaintiff’s offer to evict Defendant Lin. Plaintiff’s offer was purely illusory.
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Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 at that stage in the trial without additional foundation
and authentication. Although the Trial Court is granted great discretion in
admitting evidence, the Trial Court abused its’ discretion in this case.
Documents may be admitted, after authentication, under rule 901 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence. The rule places the burden of authenticating the
document on the party seeking its admission. Barrientos ex rel. Nelson v.
Jones, 2012 UT 33, ¶ 31, 282 P.3d 50. Without Exhibit 1, Plaintiff has no
evidence that Plaintiff was assigned the right to pursue this matter against
Defendant Cao.
Further, the assignment in Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 assigns the leases and
the deposits for those leases. There is no mention of transfer of the
guarantees to the leases. There is no evidence that Riverview Property
conveyed or intended to convey any guarantees that they had in their
possession. Lacking specific language transferring the guarantees, the
Plaintiff lacks the necessary privity with Defendant Cao to enforce the
guaranty against her. Because the evidence was insufficient to support the
Plaintiff’s claim of assignment, the Court should affirm the decision of Trial
Court on these grounds. In the alternative, The Court should remand this
matter to the Trial Court for a decision on this issue.
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CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The Court should reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the decision
of the Trial Court. The Trial Court properly held that Plaintiff and
Defendant Lin modified the lease agreement by allowing partial payments
without the knowledge of Defendant Cao. The modification of Plaintiff and
Defendant Lin without the approval of Defendant Cao, released Defendant
Cao as the surety to Plaintiff and Defendant Lin. The Workout Agreement
went beyond a mere extension of time and modified the late fee obligations
of the parties. The Workout Agreement also modified the Lease terms. In
the alternative, a review of the Lease Extension shows that Defendant Cao’s
obligation as surety expired on September 30, 2008 when the lease between
Defendant Cao and Riverview Properties expired. Alternately, there is
insufficient evidence to support the Plaintiff’s claim that Plaintiff was
assigned the guarantee of Defendant Cao from Riverview Properties.
Dated: January 23, 2017.
_/s/______________________
RUSSELL T. MONAHAN
Attorney for Defendant Cao
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ORME, Judge:
¶1
Appellant PC Riverview LLC appeals the district court’s
judgment concluding that the guarantor of a lease, Appellee
Xiao-Yan Cao, was not liable for amounts owed to Riverview on
the lease. We reverse.
¶2
This case arises out of a dispute over unpaid rent for
premises in a strip mall (the Property). Cao’s business was a
tenant under a lease that it later assigned to another tenant
(Tenant) in 2006. To secure the owner’s approval of the lease
assignment, Cao personally guaranteed Tenant’s obligations
under the lease, in an agreement entered into among Tenant,
Cao, and the owner. The agreement provided, in part, as follows:

PC Riverview v. Cao
Assignor and Guarantor agree to and shall remain
obligated to Landlord for the full performance of
all covenants, conditions and obligations and
duties required of Tenant under said Lease and
shall not be relieved of any performance of
obligation thereunder as the result of this
assignment.
¶3
Some time later, Riverview purchased the strip mall of
which the Property was a part. The purchase was subject to
existing leases, including Tenant’s lease. In May 2010, Riverview
sued Tenant and Cao for payment of past due rent exceeding
$22,000.00. Riverview and Tenant negotiated an agreement (the
Workout) that would resolve the lawsuit by extending Tenant’s
time to pay the delinquent rent.1 Cao was not a party to those
negotiations, and when Riverview asked her to stipulate to
dismissal of the action, Cao refused, claiming that the Workout
rescinded her obligations as the guarantor of the lease. 2 The
district court eventually dismissed the action, without prejudice,
for failure to prosecute.

1. According to counsel at oral argument, Tenant actually owed
common area maintenance fees, not past due rent in the
colloquial sense. But because the parties refer to the thenoutstanding debt as “rent” in their briefs and because the exact
nature of the amount owed pursuant to the lease is not relevant
to our disposition, we refer to the 2010 lawsuit and the Workout
as regarding rent.
2. Cao characterizes the Workout as “[t]he restructuring of lease
payments.” But as she acknowledges, the only change it effected
was the extension of time to make payments, and the district
court characterized the Workout as an extension of time to pay
acknowledged debts.
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¶4
Thereafter, Tenant continued to make all payments due
under the lease and the Workout until shortly before the
expiration of the lease, and he occupied the Property until the
lease term ended on September 30, 2013. He failed, however, to
pay the last month’s rent and a portion of the previous month’s
rent. Riverview again sued Tenant and Cao for payment of the
past due rent. The district court determined that Tenant owed
Riverview $7,326.55 in unpaid rent, $1,208.88 in prejudgment
interest, $117.00 in costs, and $1,400 in attorney fees. The court
also determined that the Workout constituted a material
modification of the lease, thus relieving Cao of her obligations as
guarantor. Therefore, the court concluded, “Cao is not liable for
the judgment obtained by Plaintiff P.C. Riverview, LLC against
[Tenant].”
¶5
The rights and obligations of a guarantor are often
defined in the terms of the guaranty. 38 Am. Jur. 2d Guaranty
§ 53 (2016) (“[T]he terms and provisions of a guaranty should
generally be construed according to the intention of the parties
in view of the surrounding circumstances. . . . [T]he parties’
intent is defined by the written terms of the guaranty.”). See also
Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(concluding that guarantors waived their right to a common law
defense by the “express terms of the original guaranties”). But
absent express terms to the contrary, “[t]he basic rights and
duties of parties under a guaranty are governed by common
law.” 38 Am. Jur. 2d Guaranty § 53 (2016). Here, the guaranty
agreement contained no provisions spelling out particular rights
in favor of Cao, such as a right to notice or a bar on extensions or
modifications absent her consent. Thus, we apply the common
law. 3
3. “Where [the parties’] intention may be gathered from the four
corners of the instrument, interpretation of the guaranty is a
question of law.” 38 Am. Jur. 2d Guaranty § 53 (2016). Likewise,
(continued…)
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¶6
According to the Restatement, as a general rule a
guarantor is relieved of her obligations “[i]f the principal obligor
and the obligee agree to a modification.” Restatement (Third) of
Suretyship & Guaranty § 41 (Am. Law Inst. 1996). But the
Restatement specifically excludes “an extension of time” from
the modifications that would discharge a guarantor. Id. We
embraced that exception in DiMeo v. Nupetco Associates, 2013 UT
App 188, 309 P.3d 251, stating that time extensions are “minor
alterations [and] are not of the nature or degree that would
trigger a discharge of [guarantor’s] pledge of security under
suretyship law.” Id. ¶ 9 n.2.
¶7
Here, Cao was not relieved of her obligations as
guarantor because the Workout was the sole modification to the
original lease, and the Workout only modified the timing of
Tenant’s payments by extending the time in which past due rent
could be paid. See supra note 2. Furthermore, the Workout
caused Cao no harm. Indeed, it actually benefitted her. She was
“obligated to Landlord for the full performance of all . . . duties
required of Tenant under said Lease,” which included paying
the remaining unpaid rent. Without the Workout, she would
have been liable for at least $22,000 in past due rent as well as
the rents coming due for the balance of the lease term. Instead,
because of the Workout, Tenant satisfied the bulk of that
obligation, correspondingly reducing Cao’s liability.
¶8
Because the Workout only extended the time for Tenant
to pay past due rent, it was not a material modification of the
(…continued)
application of the common law presents a question of law.
Associated Gen. Contractors v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, 2001 UT
112, ¶ 18, 38 P.3d 291. “We review questions of law for
correctness[.]” Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality
Board, 2006 UT 74, ¶ 9, 148 P.3d 960.
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original agreement. As a result, Cao’s obligations as guarantor
were not discharged. Therefore, we reverse the judgment in
favor of Cao and remand the case to the district court for the
entry of an appropriate judgment against Cao. 4

4. The basic amount of that judgment will be the same as the
judgment entered against Tenant. Riverview has requested and
is also entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees reasonably
incurred in this appeal, in accordance with the terms of the
agreement entered into among Tenant, Cao, and the prior
owner: “In the event of default under any of the terms of this
Agreement or the Lease, defaulting party agrees to pay all costs
incurred in enforcing this Agreement or the Lease or any right
arising ou[t] of the breach of either, and including reasonable
attorney’s fees.” On remand, the amount of that award will be
determined by the trial court.
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